ABSTRACT To enhance public safety, it is necessary to legitimately eavesdrop communication between suspicious users, such as terrorists and criminals. In this paper, we investigate legitimate eavesdropping in a wireless-powered suspicious communication network (WPSCN) with a wireless-powered suspicious transmitter and a suspicious receiver, who is legitimately eavesdropped by a legitimate monitor with the help from a wireless-powered friendly jammer. The ''harvest-then-transmit'' protocol is adopted by the suspicious communication to coordinate wireless energy transfer and information transfer. Both the suspicious receiver and the legitimate monitor can act as power sources for the suspicious transmitter and the jammer. The legitimate monitor can control the suspicious communication rate by broadcasting power signals, while the jammer can harvest energy and then interfere with the suspicious communication in collaboration with the legitimate monitor. Four different metrics are adopted to evaluate the eavesdropping performance based on different application requirements, and they are the successful eavesdropping probability, the average eavesdropping rate, the relative eavesdropping rate, and the eavesdropping energy efficiency. For each performance metric, we derive the optimal transmit power of the monitor for energy transfer and the optimal jamming transmit power of the jammer to maximize the performance metric under the peak transmit power constraint at the monitor and the energy causality constraint at the jammer. Some important insights are derived from these optimal power control policies. The simulations are conducted to verify the proposed optimal power control for legitimate eavesdropping in the WPSCN. It is shown that the proposed optimal power control policies greatly outperform other benchmark schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transferring has recently been attracted a lot attention [1] . Using this technology, wireless devices can harvest energy from RF signals transmitted by ambient or dedicated power sources. This makes the deployment of wireless powered communication networks (WPCN) be possible. In WPCN, wireless devices can charge their batteries without physical lines or even
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operate without a battery. RF energy harvesting introduces unique design problems in WPCN, such as optimization of wireless energy transferring and the placement of power sources, etc [2] - [4] . Thus, many solutions for traditional non-WPCN wireless networks will have to be redesigned to make them suitable for WPCN.
Physical-layer security problems in WPCN has also drawn great attentions. Particularly, how to protect legitimate communication from eavesdropping by malicious users in WPCN is a practical requirement. In this context, secrecy rate [5] , defined as the achievable rate of the information which is sent from the source to the destination in a perfectly secure way in the presence of eavesdroppers, is usually adopted as a basic performance metric to evaluate the physical-layer security performance in many types of communication networks, such as satellite-terrestrial networks [6] , [7] , cognitive radio networks [8] , and WPCN [9] - [14] . Specifically, in [9] , energy receivers were assumed to be potential eavesdroppers in WPCN and efficient schemes were proposed to use the energy signals as helpful interference to interfere with the energy receivers in various practical setups; In [10] , a legitimate communication link with a source node and a destination node in the presence of an eavesdropper was proposed to achieve secure communication by using a selfless wireless powered jammer; In [11] , the work in [10] was extended to orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) based WPCN; In [12] , a legitimate communication link in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was proposed to achieve a higher level of secure communication by using wireless powered jammers who help the legitimate communication in exchange for their own communication opportunities; In [13] , a WPCN with a wireless powered source node, a destination node and a power source node, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was considered and the secrecy throughput was maximized with the jamming help from the power source node; In [14] , a WPCN with multiple wirelessconsidered the scenario that the legitimate monitor can also act as a helper for the suspicious communication, and the works in [26] and [27] considered the scenario that a spoofing relay can assist legitimate eavesdropping by forwarding constructive or destructive signals to the suspicious users.
Note that the suspicious communication nodes can be wireless powered, which was not considered in all the above works in legitimate eavesdropping in [16] - [21] . Legitimate eavesdropping in wireless powered suspicious communication networks (WPSCN) is different from that in non-WPSCN. Specifically, by broadcasting energy from the legitimate monitor in WPSCN, the eavesdropping rate can be conveniently increased if eavesdropping is successful, while in non-WPSCN, increasing the eavesdropping rate can be done only by relaying the suspicious communication signals. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate legitimate eavesdropping in WPSCN. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no work on this research topic yet.
Therefore, this paper investigates legitimate eavesdropping in WPSCN. Specifically, we consider a proactive eavesdropping scenario, where a legitimate monitor with the help from a wireless powered friendly jammer aims to eavesdrop a suspicious communication link consisting of a wireless powered suspicious transmitter and a suspicious receiver. The suspicious receiver also acts as a power source for the suspicious transmitter. The suspicious communication is assumed to adopt the ''harvest-then-transmit'' protocol, where the suspicious transmitter first harvests energy from the power signals transmitted by the suspicious receiver in the wireless energy transfer phase and then uses the harvested energy to transmit information to the suspicious receiver in the wireless information transfer phase. In the wireless energy transfer phase, the legitimate monitor can broadcast power signals to let the suspicious transmitter harvest more energy to control the suspicious communication rate. The jammer can harvest energy and then send jamming signals to interfere with the suspicious communication in collaboration with the legitimate monitor. Based on different application requirements, we consider four metrics to evaluate the eavesdropping performance, i.e., the successful eavesdropping probability, the average eavesdropping rate, the relative eavesdropping rate and the eavesdropping energy efficiency. To maximize these performance metrics, it is important for the monitor to control its transmit power for energy transfer under the peak transmit power constraint and it is also important for the jammer to control its jamming transmit power under the energy causality constraint. For each performance metric, we derive the optimal transmit power of the monitor for energy transfer and the optimal jamming transmit power of the jammer. Some fundamental properties of the optimal power control are revealed as follows.
• Firstly, for maximizing the successful eavesdropping probability, the transmit powers of the jammer and the monitor are shown to be binary, where the jammer transmits just enough jamming power to ensure successfully eavesdropping only if jamming can help the monitor to successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication and the monitor transmits power for energy transfer only if the jammer requires additional energy besides the energy harvested from the suspicious receiver.
• Secondly, for maximizing the average eavesdropping rate, the transmit powers of the jammer and the monitor are also shown to be binary, where the action of the jammer is the same to the scenario of maximizing the successful eavesdropping probability while the monitor transmits at its maximum power for energy transfer as long as the monitor can successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication.
• Thirdly, for maximizing the relative eavesdropping rate, the jammer is shown to not work if eavesdropping is successful without the jamming help, is shown to transmit at the maximum jamming power if eavesdropping is failed, and is shown to transmit jamming power just enough to ensure successfully eavesdropping if jamming can help the monitor to successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication, while the monitor is shown to not transmit power if eavesdropping is failed and transferring energy by the monitor will increase the suspicious communication rate, and is shown to transmit at its maximum power for energy transfer in the other cases.
• Fourthly, for maximizing the eavesdropping energy efficiency, the jammer is shown to transmit just enough jamming power to ensure successfully eavesdropping only if jamming can help the monitor to successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication and the energy consumption is not too high, and is shown to be silent in the other case, while the monitor is shown to not transmit power if successfully eavesdropping is impossible, the required transmit power is too high, or the consumed energy is too high, and is shown to transmit at the most energy efficient power in the other cases. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model for the investigated scenarios of legitimate eavesdropping in WPSCN and formulates the four optimization problems. From Sections III to Section VI, we derive the optimal power control policies for the four optimization problems. Section VII verifies the performance of the proposed optimal power control policies for legitimate eavesdropping in WPSCN. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1 , a legitimate surveillance scenario, where a legitimate monitor with the help from a jammer eavesdrops a point-to-point suspicious communication link, is considered. All the nodes are assumed to be equipped with one single antenna each. The channel power gains between the suspicious transmitter and the suspicious receiver, between the suspicious transmitter and the legitimate monitor, between the suspicious receiver and the jammer, and between the legitimate monitor and the jammer are denoted as g 0 , g 1 , g 2 and g 3 , respectively. It is assumed that all the channels are quasi-static flat fading, and thus all the channel power gains are constant during each block transmission time. For simplicity, the block transmission time is normalized to be 1. It is also assumed that all the channel power gains, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 and g 3 are perfectly known at the legitimate monitor who is responsible for making transmit power control decisions for the legitimate monitor and the jammer. In practice, the channel power gain, g 0 , can be obtained at the legitimate monitor by overhearing the channel feedback sent from the suspicious receiver to the suspicious transmitter. On the other hand, the channel power gain, g 1 , can be estimated at the legitimate monitor by overhearing the channel training signals sent from the suspicious transmitter, while the channel power gain, g 2 , can be estimated at the jammer by overhearing the channel training signals sent from the suspicious receiver and then fed back to the legitimate monitor. For the channel power gain, g 3 , it can be obtained at the legitimate monitor by the classic channel training, estimation and feedback mechanisms.
The suspicious receiver and the legitimate monitor are assumed to be powered by conventional energy sources such as power grid, while the suspicious transmitter and the jammer are assumed to have no embedded energy sources and have to harvest energy from surrounding RF signals. Due to many advantages of supercapacitors such as small form factor and long life time [28] , we assume the harvested energy is stored in supercapacitors. Similar to [28] , we assume that the stored energy can be used in the current block transmission but not after due to high self-discharge of supercapacitors.
In each transmission block, the suspicious communication adopts the ''harvest-then-transmit'' protocol. Specifically, each block transmission time is divided into two phases, i.e., the wireless energy transfer phase with duration τ 0 and the wireless information transfer phase with duration τ 1 = 1 − τ 0 . It is assumed that the value τ 0 is fixed and determined by the suspicious communication link. In the wireless energy transfer phase, the suspicious receiver broadcasts RF energy with a constant transmit power p R , and the suspicious transmitter and the jammer harvest energy from the RF signals. In this phase, the legitimate monitor can also transmit with power p N (p N ≤ P max ) to charge the suspicious transmitter and the jammer, where P max is the peak transmit power of the legitimate monitor. The aim is two-fold. VOLUME 7, 2019 Firstly, the jammer can harvest more energy for interfering with the suspicious communication. Secondly, if the monitor can eavesdrop the suspicious communication, the more energy harvested by the suspicious transmitter, the higher eavesdropping rate that can be achieved by the monitor. The energy harvested by the suspicious transmitter and the jammer can be written as ξ T (p R g 0 + p N g 1 )τ 0 and ξ J (p R g 2 + p N g 3 )τ 0 , respectively, where ξ T and ξ J denote the energy harvesting efficiencies at the suspicious transmitter and the jammer, respectively. In the second phase, the suspicious transmitter uses the harvested energy to send information to the suspicious receiver with transmit power p T , while the jammer helps the legitimate monitor in eavesdropping the suspicious communication by sending artificial noise with transmit power p J . Thus, according to the energy causality constraint, we have
The suspicious transmitter is assumed to adaptively alter its transmit rate according to the signal-to-interferenceplus-noise ratio (SINR) at the suspicious receiver. Thus, the achievable rate at the suspicious receiver is given as
where σ 2 is the noise power. In order to maximize its transmission rate, the suspicious transmitter will transmit at its maximum allowable power, i.e.,
The achievable rate at the legitimate monitor is given as
In this paper, since we focus on the physical-layer design of legitimate eavesdropping, information at higher layers is assumed to be extracted successfully as long as the data is successfully decoded at the physical-layer. Thus, as long as r 1 ≥ r 0 , the legitimate monitor can successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication, since in this case decoding the information sent from the suspicious transmitter at the legitimate monitor can be successful. Denote X r 1 ≥r 0 as
Then X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 means that the legitimate monitor successfully eavesdrops the suspicious communication. Accordingly, the eavesdropping rate at the legitimate monitor can be written as r 0 X r 1 ≥r 0 .
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In practice, the performance of the legitimate monitoring depends on different application requirements. In this paper, we consider four metrics as the performance indicators for legitimate monitoring. The first performance metric is the successful eavesdropping probability, also known as the eavesdropping non-outage probability adopted in [17] . Such metric is suitable for delaysensitive applications with equal importance of information in different transmission blocks, since in this case it is desirable to eavesdrop over as much transmission blocks as possible. The successful eavesdropping probability can be written as E{X r 1 ≥r 0 }, where E{.} is the expectation. Then, we aim to maximize the successful eavesdropping probability by optimizing p N and p J as (P1) : max
The second performance metric is the average eavesdropping rate written as E{r 0 X r 1 ≥r 0 }. Such metric is suitable for delay-insensitive applications with equal importance of information in different transmission blocks, since in this case it is desirable to eavesdrop as much rates as possible. The average eavesdropping rate maximization problem is formulated as
s.t. constraints (8) and (9) .
The third performance metric is the relative eavesdropping rate, defined as the average eavesdropping rate over the average rate at the suspicious receiver, i.e.,
. Such metric is also suitable for delay-insensitive applications. The major difference between the relative eavesdropping rate and the average eavesdropping rate is that the relative eavesdropping rate puts more emphasis on the proportion of data eavesdropped while the average eavesdropping rate values the amount of data more. The relative eavesdropping rate maximization problem is formulated as
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. The fourth performance metric is the eavesdropping energy efficiency, defined as the average eavesdropping rate over the average power consumption at the legitimate monitor, i.e.,
, where P c is the circuit power consumption at the legitimate monitor. Such metric is suitable for the scenario where energy is valued more. The eavesdropping energy efficiency maximization problem is formulated as
s.t. constraints (8) and (9). 
III. SUCCESSFUL EAVESDROPPING PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
In this section, the successful eavesdropping probability maximization problem P1 is investigated. It is observed that P1 can be decoupled into subproblems each for a transmission block as given by
s.t. constraints (8) and (9).
It is observed that the value of X r 1 ≥r 0 depends on the relationship between
, and p T has no impact on the problem solution. The inequality
Theorem 1: The optimal solution of P1.1 is given by
where
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Remark 1: Here, we draw some conclusions from the optimal solution given by Theorem 1. There are generally two scenarios where the jammer does not need to interfere with the suspicious communication. The first scenario is when VOLUME 7, 2019 the eavesdropping link condition is better than the suspicious communication link condition, i.e., g 1 ≥ g 0 . In this scenario, the monitor can successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication without jamming. The second scenario is when the eavesdropping link condition is worse than the suspicious communication link condition, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , and the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is relatively worse compared to the interference to the monitor link condition, i.e.,
, or the jamming transmit power is not enough, i.e., P t > P max . In this scenario, the monitor cannot successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication either with or without jamming. The jammer does help the monitor only when the eavesdropping link condition is worse than the suspicious communication link condition, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , and the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is relatively better compared to the interference to the monitor link condition, i.e.,
, while also the jamming transmit power is high enough to support successfully eavesdropping, i.e., P t ≤ P max . Furthermore, the legitimate monitor only broadcasts energy in the wireless energy transfer phase with just enough transmit power such that the jammer can help it successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication.
IV. AVERAGE EAVESDROPPING RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, the average eavesdropping rate maximization problem P2 is investigated. P2 can be decoupled into subproblems each for a transmission block as given by
constraints (8) and (9).
By inserting (3) and (4) into P2.1, we have
Theorem 2:
The optimal solution for p * J of P2.2 is given by (14) , and the optimal solution for p * N of P2.2 is given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. Remark 2: Here, some conclusions are drawn from the optimal solution of the average eavesdropping rate maximization problem given by Theorem 2. The action of the jammer is the same as discussed in Remark 1, while the action of the legitimate monitor is different. If the legitimate monitor can successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication without the help from the jammer, i.e., g 1 ≥ g 0 , then, the legitimate monitor will transmit at its maximum allowable value P max in the wireless energy transfer phase to charge the suspicious transmitter with more energy to increase its eavesdropping rate. If the legitimate monitor cannot successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication without the help from the jammer, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , but if the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is good enough such that
and the jamming transmit power is high enough to support successfully eavesdropping, i.e., P t ≤ P max , the legitimate monitor will also transmit at P max in the wireless energy transfer phase to charge the suspicious transmitter to increase its eavesdropping rate and to charge the jammer to interfere with the suspicious receiver with just enough jamming power. In the other cases if the legitimate monitor cannot successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication with or without the help from the jammer, the legitimate monitor will not transmit energy in the wireless energy transfer phase.
V. RELATIVE EAVESDROPPING RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, the relative eavesdropping rate maximization problem P3 is investigated. To solve P3, an auxiliary variable θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 ) is introduced to reformulate P3 as
constraints (8) and (9).
Let θ * denote the optimal value of P3.1. For a fixed θ ≤ θ * , P3.1 is feasible, otherwise if θ > θ * , P3.1 is infeasible. Thus, using a simple bisection search over θ, and checking the feasibility of P3.1 at each search, the optimal θ * , p * J and p * N can be obtained. Therefore, we only need to check the feasibility of P3.1 for a fixed θ. For this, the following problem is formulated as
Note that if the obtained optimal value of P3.2 is larger than or equal to zero, then P3.1 is feasible for the fixed θ. P3.2 can be further decoupled into subproblems each for a transmission block as given by
By inserting (3) and (4) into P3.3, P3.3 is re-expressed as
Theorem 3:
The optimal solution of P3.4 for a fixed θ is given by (24) and (25) , as shown at the bottom of the next page. It is interesting to observe that the optimal solution of P3.4 for a fixed θ does not depend on the value of θ . This indicates that the solution given by (24) and (25) is the optimal solution of P3.4 for any θ including the optimal θ * . That is to say, there is no need to use a bisection search over θ, and the solution given by (24) and (25) is the optimal solution of P3.
Remark 3: Here, some insights are drawn from the optimal solution of the relative eavesdropping rate maximization problem given by Theorem 3. Without the help from the jammer, if the legitimate monitor can successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication, i.e., g 1 ≥ g 0 , then, the legitimate monitor will transmit at P max in the wireless energy transfer phase in order to let the suspicious transmitter harvest more energy to increase its eavesdropping rate. Otherwise, if the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is good enough such that
and the required jamming transmit power is high enough to support successfully eavesdropping, i.e., P t ≤ P max , the legitimate monitor will transmit at P max in the wireless energy transfer phase to let the suspicious transmitter harvest more energy to increase its eavesdropping rate and also to charge the jammer, while the jammer will transmit just enough power to enable successful eavesdropping. If the eavesdropping link condition is worse than the suspicious communication link condition, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , and the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is not good enough, i.e.,
, sending interference by the jammer cannot let the legitimate monitor eavesdrop the suspicious communication. Besides, if the eavesdropping link condition is worse than the suspicious communication link condition, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , and the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is good enough, i.e.,
, and however, there lacks enough energy for the jammer to send enough interference to let the legitimate monitor eavesdrop the suspicious communication, i.e., P t > P max , the jammer also cannot let the legitimate monitor eavesdrop the suspicious communication. In the above scenarios that the legitimate monitor cannot successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication, the jammer will transmit at the maximum allowable power to interfere with the suspicious communication. If the monitor broadcasts energy in the wireless energy transfer phase, the suspicious transmitter can harvest more energy to achieve a higher communication rate and the jammer can also harvest more energy to interfere more severely with the suspicious communication to reduce the suspicious communication rate. Thus, if the condition
is satisfied, the latter effect holds the upper hand compared to the former effect, and the monitor will transmit at P max in the wireless energy transfer phase, otherwise, the monitor will keep silent in the wireless energy transfer phase.
VI. EAVESDROPPING ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION
In this section, the eavesdropping energy efficiency maximization problem P4 is investigated. P4 belongs to nonlinear fractional programming and we transform it to a parametric problem by introducing a variable q as given by (26) s.t. constraints (8) and (9) .
Thus, by following the Dinkelbach method [29] , P4 is decomposed into two levels of optimization. At the lower level optimization, P4.1 with a given q is solved. At the higher level optimization, q is iteratively updated as q = 
Theorem 4:
The optimal solution of P4.3 for a fixed q is given by (29) and (30), as shown at the bottom of the this page, where p o is given by (31), as shown at the bottom of the this page.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. Remark 4: Here, some insights are drawn from the optimal solution of the eavesdropping energy efficiency maximization problem given by Theorem 4. If successful eavesdropping can be achieved without the help from the jammer, i.e., g 1 ≥ g 0 , the jammer will keep silent and the legitimate monitor will transmit energy with optimal power in the range [0, P max ] to maximize the eavesdropping energy efficiency. If successful eavesdropping cannot be achieved provided that the eavesdropping link condition is inferior to the suspicious communication link condition g 1 < g 0 and the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is not good enough, i.e.,
, the jammer will keep silent and the legitimate monitor will not transmit energy in the wireless energy transfer phase to save energy consumption. When the legitimate monitor cannot eavesdrop the suspicious communication without the help from the
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jammer, i.e., g 1 < g 0 , and successful eavesdropping can be achieved with the help from the jammer when the jamming interference to the suspicious receiver link condition is good enough, i.e.,
, the jammer will interfere with the suspicious communication with just enough transmit power
and the legitimate monitor will transmit energy with optimal power in the range [(P t ) + , P max ] to maximize the eavesdropping energy efficiency, under the condition that the required jamming power is not too high, i.e., P t ≤ P max , and the consumed energy is not too high, i.e., ,
Otherwise, even if the jammer can help the legitimate monitor to eavesdrop successfully under the condition g 0 g 3 < g 1 g 2 , g 1 < g 0 , the jammer will also keep silent and the legitimate monitor will not transmit energy in the wireless energy transfer phase if the required jamming power is too high, i.e., P t > P max or the consumed energy is too high, i.e., q(P t ) + > τ 1 ln 1 +
.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results of the performance of legitimate eavesdropping in the WPSCN. We adopt the channel power gain model such that g = 10 −3 d −2.5 h, where d is the distance and h follows exponential distribution with unit mean. We assume that the suspicious transmitter, the suspicious receiver, the legitimate monitor, and the jammer are placed along a horizontal line. Specifically, the suspicious receiver, the legitimate monitor, and the jammer are placed sequentially on the same side of the suspicious transmitter. Since the distance for powering wireless devices by RF energy harvesting is usually small [30] , a small WPSCN is considered. Unless otherwise specified, the distance between the suspicious transmitter and the suspicious receiver is d TR = 10 m, the distance between the suspicious receiver and the legitimate monitor is d RN = 1 m, the distance between the legitimate monitor and the jammer is d NJ = 9 m, and we set σ 2 = 10 −10 W, τ 0 = τ 1 = 0.5, ξ T = ξ J = 0.6, p R = 10 W, P c = 1 W and P max = 20 W. For comparison, we consider five benchmark schemes as follows: 1) Maximum-power jamming without energy transferring: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not transmit energy signals in the wireless energy transfer phase and the jammer transmits jamming signals with the maximum allowable power in the wireless information transfer phase. 2) Maximum-power jamming and energy transferring: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor transmits energy signals with maximum power in the wireless energy transfer phase and the jammer transmits jamming signals with the maximum allowable power in the wireless information transfer phase. 3) On-off jamming without energy transferring: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not transmit energy signals in the wireless energy transfer phase and the jammer transmits jamming signals with the maximum allowable power in the wireless information transfer phase only if eavesdropping is not successful without jamming, i.e., g 1 < g 0 . 4) On-off jamming and energy transferring: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor transmits energy signals with maximum power in the wireless energy transfer phase and the jammer transmits jamming signals with the maximum allowable power in the wireless information transfer phase only if eavesdropping is not successful without jamming, i.e., g 1 < g 0 . 5) Passive eavesdropping without jamming: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not transmit energy signals in the wireless energy transfer phase and the jammer does not transmit jamming signals in the wireless information transfer phase. Fig. 2 compares the proposed optimal power control scheme and five benchmark schemes under different values of P max . It is shown from Fig. 2(a) that the proposed optimal scheme and the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme achieve the same successful eavesdropping probability while the other benchmark schemes achieve lower successful eavesdropping probability. This indicates that the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme is also optimal for maximizing the successful eavesdropping probability. However, as shown in Fig. 3 , the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme consumes more than 100 times higher average transmit power at the legitimate monitor than the proposed optimal scheme. This indicates that our proposed optimal scheme is more energy-efficient than the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme for maximizing the successful eavesdropping probability. It is also shown that the on-off jamming without energy transferring scheme achieves the same optimal successful eavesdropping probability when P max = 0 and achieves increasingly lower successful eavesdropping probability than the optimal one, which signifies the importance of energy transferring at the legitimate monitor. Besides, it is shown that the maximum-power jamming and energy transferring scheme achieves increasingly lower successful eavesdropping probability as P max increases. This indicates that, instead of helping eavesdropping, unconditional jamming and energy transferring will do harm to eavesdropping. From Figs. 2(b) and 2(c) , it is shown that the proposed optimal scheme achieves significantly higher average eavesdropping rate and relative eavesdropping rate than the other benchmark schemes, and such performance gain increases as P max increases. From 2(d), it is shown that the proposed optimal scheme achieves the highest eavesdropping energy efficiency than the other benchmark schemes. It is also shown that the maximum-power jamming and energy transferring scheme and the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme achieve increasingly lower eavesdropping energy efficiency as P max increases, which indicates that the energy transferring at the legitimate monitor for these two benchmark schemes is energy inefficient. Furthermore, it is shown that the eavesdropping energy efficiency achieved by the proposed optimal scheme increases slightly as P max increases and then quickly saturates. This indicates that, from the perspective of maximizing eavesdropping energy efficiency, transferring energy at the legitimate monitor is usually energy inefficient. Fig. 4 compares the proposed optimal power control scheme and five benchmark schemes under different values of d NJ . It is shown from Fig. 4(a) that the successful eavesdropping probability achieved by the proposed scheme and benchmark on-off jamming schemes first increases as d NJ increases, then turns to decrease as d NJ increases further, and finally approaches to the value without jamming. This is explained as follows. Since a larger d NJ means that less energy can be harvested by the jammer, the influence of jamming on the legitimate monitoring will eventually vanish. Also, since the interference from the jammer to the legitimate monitor gets weaker as d NJ increases, the successful eavesdropping probability may increase as can be seen when d NJ is small. The above observation indicates that the jammer is better to be deployed at a medium distance from the monitor. It is also shown that the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme achieves the same successful eavesdropping probability as the proposed optimal scheme. However, as shown in Fig. 5 , the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme consumes much higher average transmit power at the legitimate monitor than the proposed optimal scheme, especially when d NJ is small. This indicates that the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme is more energyinefficient than our proposed optimal scheme for maximizing the successful eavesdropping probability. Besides, it is shown that the on-off jamming without energy transferring achieves the successful eavesdropping probability close to the one achieved by the proposed optimal scheme. This indicates that the effect of transferring energy by the legitimate monitor on the successful eavesdropping probability is relatively weak. From Fig. 4(b) , it is shown that the average eavesdropping rate achieved by the proposed optimal scheme is much higher than the other benchmark schemes. It is also shown that the effect of d NJ on the average eavesdropping rate achieved by the proposed optimal scheme is same to the case of maximizing successful eavesdropping probability. Besides, it is shown that the average eavesdropping rate achieved by the maximum-power jamming and energy transferring scheme increases as d NJ increases and approaches to the value achieved by the optimal scheme. This indicates that when the effect of jamming is trivial, it is better for the legitimate monitor to transmit at maximum power to achieve higher average eavesdropping rate. From Fig. 4(c) , it is shown that the proposed optimal scheme achieves almost 100% relative eavesdropping rate when d NJ is small and as d NJ increases, the achieved relative eavesdropping rate decreases. This indicates that the proposed optimal scheme is more effective when d NJ is small. From Fig. 4(d) , it is shown that as d NJ increases, the eavesdropping energy efficiency achieved by the proposed optimal scheme first increases as d NJ increases, then turns to decreases as d NJ increases further and approaches to the value without jamming. This indicates that the energy transferring by the legitimate monitor is usually unwise for maximizing the eavesdropping energy efficiency when the jammer is far away from the legitimate monitor. Fig. 6 compares the proposed optimal power control scheme and five benchmark schemes under different values of ξ , where ξ T = ξ J = ξ . It is shown from Fig. 6(a) that, as ξ increases, the successful eavesdropping probability achieved by the proposed optimal scheme and the on-off jamming schemes increases, while the successful eavesdropping probability achieved by the other benchmark schemes is almost unchanged. This indicates that harvesting more energy by the suspicious transmitter and the jammer can help the legitimate monitor to achieve a higher successful eavesdropping probability. It is also shown from Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 7 that, although the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme achieves the same successful eavesdropping probability as the optimal scheme, it consumes much higher average transmit power at the legitimate monitor. From Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(c) , it is shown that the average eavesdropping rate and relative eavesdropping rate achieved by the optimal scheme increase as ξ increases, and are significantly higher than those achieved by the other benchmark schemes. This indicates that by harvesting more energy at the suspicious transmitter and the jammer, the legitimate monitor can eavesdrop more information from the suspicious communication. From 6(d), it is shown that the eavesdropping energy efficiency achieved by the proposed optimal scheme is the highest, while the maximum-power jamming and energy transferring scheme and the on-off jamming and energy transferring scheme achieve the lowest eavesdropping energy efficiency. This indicates that transferring energy at the legitimate monitor unconditionally is energy inefficient. It is also shown that the eavesdropping energy efficiency increases as ξ increases for the proposed optimal scheme. This indicates that by harvesting more energy at the suspicious transmitter and the jammer, a higher eavesdropping energy efficiency can be achieved at the legitimate monitor.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates legitimate eavesdropping assisted by a wireless powered jammer in a WPSCN consisting of a wireless powered suspicious transmitter and a suspicious receiver. The legitimate monitor is able to control the suspicious communication rate by broadcasting power signals, while the jammer can interfere with the suspicious communication in collaboration with the legitimate monitor. To evaluate the eavesdropping performance based on different application requirements, we adopt four different metrics, namely the successful eavesdropping probability, the average eavesdropping rate, the relative eavesdropping rate and the eavesdropping energy efficiency. For maximizing these performance metrics, we derive the optimal transmit power of the monitor for energy transfer and the optimal jamming transmit power of the jammer under the peak transmit power constraint at the monitor and the energy causality constraint at the jammer, from which some important insights are gained. Simulations show that the proposed optimal power control policies for legitimate eavesdropping greatly outperform other conventional heuristic schemes.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let p * J and p * N denote the optimal solution of P1.1. We discuss p * J and p * N in the following three cases:
. There are two subcases depending on the relationship between g 1 and g 0 :
-Subcase 1.1: g 1 ≥ g 0 . In this subcase, we can set p * J = 0 to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 and set p * N = 0 to satisfy the constraints in P1.1. -Subcase 1.2: g 1 < g 0 . In this subcase, it is impossible to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 for P1.1. Thus, we simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0.
• Case 2: g 0 g 3 < g 1 g 2 . In this case, X r 1 ≥r 0 is equal to 1 only if p J ≥
. There are also two subcases depending on the relationship between g 1 and g 0 :
-Subcase 2.1: g 1 ≥ g 0 . In this subcase, we can simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0 to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 and satisfy the constraints in P1.1. -Subcase 2.2: g 1 < g 0 . In this subcase, we can set
to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1, but it has to satisfy the constraint (8), written as
, and the constraint (9). Combining these two inequalities, we have P t ≤ p N ≤ P max , where
and p * N = (P t ) + , where (.) + = max(0, .), to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 and satisfy the constraints in P1.1. Otherwise, it is impossible to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 for P1.1 and we simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0.
• Case 3: g 0 g 3 = g 1 g 2 . In this case, the value of X r 1 ≥r 0 does not depend on p J and p N , and thus we simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0. Based on the above discussions, we have the optimal solution of P1.1 as given by (14) and (15).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let p * J and p * N denote the optimal solution of P2.2. We discuss p * J and p * N in the following three cases:
. Then, the following problem is formulated under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 as given by (P2.2.1) : max
There are two subcases for P2. 
< 0, it is impossible to satisfy all the constraints in P2.2.1. Thus, it is impossible to let X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1, and we simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0.
. Then, the following problem is formulated under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 as given by (P2.2.2) : max
constraints (8) and (9) .
. Thus, combing with the constraint 0 ≤ p N ≤ P max , if P t > P max , P2.2.2 is infeasible and we simply set p * J = 0 and p * N = 0. Otherwise, if P t ≤ P max , in order to maximize the objective function in P2.2.2, we have p
and p * N = P max .
• Case 3: g 0 g 3 = g 1 g 2 . In this case, p J has no impact on the value of X r 1 ≥r 0 , and thus we set p * J = 0 to maximize the objective function in P2.2. There are two subcases: -Subcase 3.1: g 1 ≥ g 0 . In this subcase, X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1, we can set p * N = P max to maximize the objective function in P2.2. -Subcase 3.2: g 1 < g 0 . In this subcase, X r 1 ≥r 0 = 0, and we simply set p * N = 0. Based on the above discussions, The optimal p * J for P2.2 is same with P1.1 as given by (14) , and the optimal p * N for P2.2 is given by (18) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let p * J (θ ) and p * N (θ ) denote the optimal solution of P3.4 for a fixed θ . We discuss p * J (θ ) and p * N (θ ) in the following three cases:
and P3.4 is re-expressed under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 as
constraints (8) and (9), and under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 0 as
constraints (8) . By inserting
It is observed that the objective function of P3.4.3 is an increasing function of p N if
and is a decreasing function of p N if
. Thus, the solution in this subcase is
• Case 2: g 0 g 3 < g 1 g 2 . In this case, X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 is equivalent to p J ≥
and P3.4 can be rewritten under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1 as
constraints (8) 
. Considering the constraint 0 ≤ p N ≤ P max , if P t ≤ P max , P3.4.4 is feasible and the solution can be easily obtained as p * J (θ) =
and p * N (θ ) = P max . Otherwise, if P t > P max , P3.4.4 is infeasible and we need to solve P3.4.5 to obtain p * J (θ ) and p * N (θ ). The constraints (46) and (8) can be combined as p J ≤ min
. Considering P t > P max and p N ≤ P max , we have
and thus the constraint
. Since the objective function of P3.4.5 is an increasing function of p J , the optimal solution of p J under the condition
The objective function of P3.4.6 is an increasing function of p N if
. Thus the solution of P3.4.6 is
The optimal solution for this subcase is summarized in (49) and (50), as shown at the top of the next page.
• Case 3: g 0 g 3 = g 1 g 2 . In this case, p J has no impact on the value of X r 1 ≥r 0 . There are two subcases: 
and under the condition X r 1 ≥r 0 = 0 as given by
constraints (8) and (9) . (57), as shown at the top of the previous page.
• Case 3: g 0 g 3 = g 1 g 2 . In this case, the value of X r 1 ≥r 0 does not depend on p J . There are two subcases: -Subcase 3.1: g 1 ≥ g 0 . In this subcase, X r 1 ≥r 0 = 1. It is seen that the objective function of P4.3 is a decreasing function of p J . Thus, we set p * J (q) = 0. The optimal value of p N is optimized by setting the derivative of the objective function in P4.3 to zero as given by (55). -Subcase 1.2: g 1 < g 0 . In this subcase, X r 1 ≥r 0 = 0.
It is easy to observe that the optimal value of P4.3 is zero which can be achieved by setting p * J (q) = 0 and p * N (q) = 0. Based on the above discussions, we have the optimal solution of P4.3 for a fixed q as given by (29) and (30 
